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Cardozo: The Nature of the JudicialProcess.
Holmes: Collected Papers.
Each member of the faculty will have charge of a group of firstyear men in the Reading Course.

NOTES
INHERITANCE TAXATION OF BONDS AND NOTES

In a recent Virginia case an inheritance tax was levied on bonds
of a Virginia corporation owned by a decedent resident in California. The bonds were actually located in a safe deposit box
in New York City. A similar tax was levied on the transfer of
stocks of the same corporation. The bonds were secured by a
mortgage on assets, of the corporation, in Virginia, which mortgage
was held by trustees in New York. Held-that the state of Virginia had no taxable interest in the bonds and that the Virginia
statute did not authorize the collection of such a tax.' The transfer
tax levied on the stock was not contested by the administrators.
The case raises several questions of vital interest:
First; the validity of the transfer tax levied on the stock of
a domestic corporation which stock is held by a non-resident decedent outside of the state. It is generally conceded that, on the transfer
of shares of stock, taxes are valid if levied at the domicile of the
corporation, or of the owner. 2 The laws of the state which created
the corporation protect the transfer of the stock.
Second; the validity of an inheritance tax levied on tangible personal property, owned by a resident, actually located outside of the
state. Under the old rule mobilia sequuntur personam the state in
'Com. v. Huntington, 138 S. E. 650 (Va., 1927).
'Rhode Island Hospital v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69; 46 Sup. Ct. 256 (1926),
reversing 187 N. C. 263 (1924), held that stock of a foreign corporation

actually located outside of the state was not taxable in N. C. even though
66 2/3 per cent of the corporation's property was in North Carolina; In, re
Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E. 707 (1896); Matter of Fearing, 200 N. Y.
340, 93 N. E. 956 (1911) ; Fuller v. South Carolina Tax Com., 128 S. C. 14,
121 S. E. 478 (1924).
For discussion of Rhode Island Hospital case see 3 N. C. L. Rev. 107
(1924), 4 N. C. L. Rev. 92 (1925); cf. Wachovia Bank v. Doughton, 270 U. S.
69, 47 Sup. Ct. 202 (1925), reversing 189 N. C. 50 (1925), where a tax on a
power of appointment of a trust res vested in a resident of North Carolina,
was held invalid, because this state had no taxable interest in the res which
was located in Mass.; see Frick v. Pa., 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1924).
A deduction must be allowed at the domicile of the owner of stock in a foreign corporation, for an inheritance tax already paid at the domicile of the
corporation.

NOTES
which the owner was domiciled when he died taxed the personal
property of the estate because it was this state's laws which protected
the devolution of the estate.3 But this rule was abrogated as to
tangible personal property outside of the state in the Frick case 4
which held that such property could be taxed only by the state in
which it was actually located.
Third; the validity of inheritance taxes levied on bonds and
negotiable notes, sometimes secured by mortgages, owned by a
resident but deposited by him outside the state. It is this phase of
the question of inheritance taxation which has raised a difficult
problem and which the courts are reluctant in settling. The question involves a great deal more than mere logic and law. It is
truly an economic problem. Intangible personal property is floating
capital which moves from place to place, and which is moved from
state to state to avoid taxation. By laying down arbitrary rules of
law this type of capital may be driven from one state to another,
or hedged in by artificial barriers, the effects of which would be a
burden on commerce.3
Under the present system inheritance taxes may be levied on
intangible personal property at the domicile of the decedent. 6 Tangible property, as we have seen, must be taxed, if at all, at its situs.7
These classification, however, do not help us in determining whether
such property as corporate bonds or negotiable notes are tangible
or intangible. According to one view the obligation which the paper
security represents is so closely incorporated in the instrument itself
that it may be regarded as tangible personal property for the purpose of taxation. The Supreme Court of the United States, on
several occasions has said this.8 "Bonds and negotiable instruments
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 429 (1819); State Tax
on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 300 (1877) ; Hointhall v. Burwall,

109 N. C. 10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891).

'Prick v. Pa., supra, note 2, where it was held that tangible personal property must be taxed at situs and not at the domicile of the decedent; see State
Tax on Foreign-HeldBonds or Notes Secured by a Mortgage on Land Within
the State, 12 Corn. L. Q. 172 (1926).
'Proceedings of the National Tax Ass'n., 1922, p. 398.
'Supra, note 2.
Supra, note 4.
Wheeler v. Shoiner, 233 U. S.434, 439, 34 Sup. Ct. 607 (1913). "It is well
settled that bank bills and municipal bonds are in such concrete tangible form
that they are subject to taxation where found, irrespective of the domicile of
the owner. Notes and mortgages are of the same nature" (majority view) ;
but see p. 445: "We cannot assent to the doctrine that mere presence of the
evidence of debt, such as these notes . . . amounts to the presence of
property within the state" (minority view).

68

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

are more than merely evidences of debt. The debt is inseparable
from the paper which declares and constitutes it. . . . 'It is
clear from the statutes referred to and the authorities cited and
from the understanding of business men as well as jurists and legislators, that mortgages, bills and notes have for many purposes
been regarded as property and not as mere evidences of debt and
that they may thus have a situs at the place where they are found,
like other visible, tangible chattels.'"
It is submitted that with this
authority, bonds, bills and notes and other similar instruments may
be considered as tangible personal property, and so come within the
rule of the Frick case. But the Supreme Court has not yet decided
squarely that bonds and negotiable notes may be taxed at situs only,
and there is reason to believe that the Frick case will not be followed
as to bonds and negotiable notes.
Fourth; may a state tax the bond-holder's interest represented by
a mortgage on property within the state? Under the present rule,
of which the principal case is an example, such an interest is not
taxable but there is considerable argument on the other side, the
essence of which is that the laws of the state in which the property
is located must be invoked for the protection of the bond-holder's
interest.1 0
Several plans for relieving the situation have been formulated
by the National Tax association, the most promising of which seems
to be the plan for reciprocity among the states.1" It seems that this
is the path to the solution rather than by court decision.
G. M. SnAW.
LADLoR 'S DUTY To RE-RENT PREMISES
In Walsh et al. v. E. G..Shinner & Co.,' a tenant abandoned
premises two years before the expiration of his lease. Before vaca'Italics ours. DeGanay v. Lederer, etc., 250 U. S. 376 (1918) at 381, but

see State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wallace 300 (1872) at page 323:
"It is undoubtedly true that actual situs of personal property which has a
visible and tangible existence, and not the domicile of the owner, will, in many
cases, determine the state in which it may be taxed. The same is true of
public securities consisting of municipal bonds, and circulating notes of bank-

ing institutions; the former by general use, have acquired the character of, and
are treated as, property in the place where they are found, though removed
from the domicile of the owner; the latter are treated and pass as money
wherever they are. But other personal property, consisting of bonds, mortgages and debts generally, have no situs independent of the domicile of the
owner. .

"State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds or Notes Secured by a Mortgage on
.Land in the State, supra, note 4.
'Proceedings of the National Tax Ass'n., 1926, at page 325.
120 Fed. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 3, 1927).

NOTES
ting he undertook to get the landlords a tenant for the remainder of
the term and promised to continue responsible for the reserved rent.
The tenant found and presented to the landlords several persons who
would have been suitable and responsible tenants and who desired
to rent the premises upon the same terms. But the landlords
declined except for a prohibitive rental and, declaring a breach of
the lease, entered and took possession. The landlords sued for
damages for breach of the lease reckoned on the cost of restoring
the premises to their original condition, and on loss of rent for the
remainder of the term, and had a verdict for a sum which excluded
rent. They appealed assigning error in the admission of testimony
to prove that loss of rent was due to their refusal to accept suitable
tenants when available, and in instructions to the jury that it was their
duty as landlords to mitigate the damages resulting from the breach
of the lease, if possible. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
By an early English statute2 the landlord had no right to enter
premises abandoned by the tenant except by special proceeding.
Likewise there are two early decisions in this country, evidently
influenced by the English law, which hold that the landlord is a
trespasser if he enters before the end of the term, though the tenant
has abandoned the premises.3 But by the weight of authority in
this country today, it is held that the landlord may enter the
abandoned premises to perform any necessary repairs or to prevent
a deterioration of the premises, without subjecting himself to liability.4 And a few jurisdictions hold that the landlord may resume
possession of the premises as if the lease had never been made. 5 In
an Iowa and a North Carolina case 6 it is decided that after resumption of control of the premises by the landlord the tenant cannot
assert a right to return. However, if his re-entrance is in exclusion
of the tenant, the decisions vary as to the result. If he re-lets the
premises,7 or re-enters for the purpose of assuming occupancy him'11 Geo. 2, c.19, § 16 (1737).

'Brown v. Kite, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 233 (1814) ; Shannon v. Burr, 1 Hilt.
39 (N. Y., 1856).
'Rucker v. Mason, 161 Pac. 195 (Okl., 1916); Ruple v. Taughenbaugh, 72

Colo. 171, 210 Pac. 72 (1922); Scott v. Beecher, 91 Mich. 590, 52 N. W. 21
(1892) semble.

'Wheat v. Watson, 57 Ala, 581 (1877); Kiplinger v. Green, 61 Mich. 340,
28 N. W. 121 (1886) ; Zigler v. McClellan, 15 Or. 499, 16 Pac. 179 (1887).

'Hailer v. Squire, 91 Iowa 10, 58 N. W. 921 (1894); Torrans v,. Stricklin,
52 N.
C. (Jones Law) 50 (1859).
T
Kean v. Rogers, 146 Iowa 559, 123 N. W. 754 (1909) ; McGinn v. Gladding Dry Goods Co., 40 R. I. 348, 101 AtI. 129 (1917); Gray v. Kaufman
Co., 162 N. Y. 388, 56 N. E. 403 (1900) ; note, 3 A. L. R. 1080. Contra: Hoke
v. Williamson, 98 Kan. 580, 158 Pac. 1115 (1916).
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self, s most courts hold this a surrender by operation of law. If the
lease provides that upon non-payment of rent there may be a re-entry
and consequent termination of the leasehold estate, there is a danger
that the landlord may be held to have ended the term by forfeiture?
Or the act of the landlord in making a new lease, together with the
entrance and possession of the new lessee, may be construed as an
eviction of the original tenant.' 0 If the court concludes that the
landlord has effected a release of the tenant by any of the foregoing
methods, the tenant's liability for rent as such is terminated, because
such liability is based on the relationship between landlord and tenant.
Therefore the question, whether upon abandonment of the
premises the landlord may lease to another without thereby terminating the tenant's liability for rent, becomes one of great practical
importance. Numerous decisions hold that the landlord may so
re-let to another and still hold the former tenant." In other jurisdictions, in order to prevent a surrender, the landlord must notify
the tenant that the re-letting is on the latter's account.' 2 The general
rule and weight of authority is that a landlord, on abandonment of
the premises by the tenant, is under no obligation to re-let them; he
may remain inactive and sue the tenant for rent as it matures. 13
Of course this result is eminently correct where the entrance of the
landlord is to be attended by any of the disastrous results of
forfeiture, etc., noted above; and in such jurisdictions it can never
be the so called "duty"'. 4 of the landlord to re-rent the premises.
'Dennis v. Miller, 68 N. J. L. 320, 53 AtI. 394 (1902); Hart v. Pratt, 19
Wash. 560, 53 Pac. 711 (1898).
'International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U. S. 364 (Mass., 1906); Woodbury

v. Print, 198 Mass. 1, 84 N. E. 441 (1908).
" Cibell v. Hill, 1 Leo. 110, 74 Eng. Reprint 102 (1588) ; Hall v. Burgess,
5 B. & C. 332 (Eng., 1826).
'Marshall v. Grosse Clothing Co., 184 Ill. 421, 56 N. E. 807 (1900);
Schelky v. Koch, 119 N. C. 80, 25 S. E. 713 (1896); Murill v. Palmer, 164
N. C. 50, 80-S. E. 55 (1913) ; Auer v. Haffman, 132 Wis. 620, 112 N. W. 1090
(1907).
"Hayes v. Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 72 S. W. 563 (1903) ; Brown v. Cairns,
63 Kan. 584, 66 Pac. 639 (1901).
" Abraham v. Gheens, 205 Ky. 289, 265 S. W. 778 (1924); Goldman v.
Broyles, 141 S. W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); note, 40 A. L. R. 190.
"According to Hohfeld's terminology it is erroneous to use the 'term duty
in this sense. Where a duty exists there is a concurrent liability, and hence
if this relation of the landlord to the tenant were a duty in the strict, legal
sense, it would follow that upon failure to make a reasonable attempt to mitigat8 the damages, he would himself be liable to an action for damages resulting from breach of the duty. Obviously this is not the result. A correct statement would be that the plaintiff rested under a legal disability to claim for
damages which he might reasonably have obviated or reduced. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, pp. 35, 65; 26 Yale L. J. 710; 28 ibid., 827; 29 ibid.,
130; Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157; 30 Yale L. J. 100.

NOTES
But in the jurisdictions where the landlord can re-let without forfeiture, is there any reason why the general duty to the defendant
to minimize his damages should not be applicable to the landlord
in this case? It is recognized that if the landlord re-enters under a
provision of the lease permitting him to do so after his tenant has
vacated the premises,' 5 or where the lease requires him to re-rent
in case of abandonment, 16 it is his duty to use reasonable diligence in
seeking a new tenant in order to lessen his damages. But some
courts are in accord with the principal case in recognizing this reletting by the landlord as a duty irrespective of the provisions of
the lease.17 This application of the rule of avoidable consequences
would permit the landlord upon breach of a lease only to recover
the rent for the remainder of the term, less such revenue as he could
reasonably have secured by re-letting during that period.
This is apparently the better rule. It is in conformity with the
present day development of the law of landlord and tenant which
is away from the feudal basis of privity of estate and toward the
modern conception of contractual obligation. In the event of its
general adoption the penalizing of the landlord incident to a surrender by operation of law, forfeiture or eviction will be supplanted
by the principles governing the effect of repudiation, breach and
rescission of other contracts.' 8 The landlord then will be remitted
from the economic waste of standing idly by and permitting the
premises to lie vacant, and forbidden a recovery for damages which,
by reasonable efforts, he could have avoided.' 9
A. L. BUTLER.
Marling v. Allison, 213 Ill. App. 224 (1919) ; Bradbury v. Higginson, 162

Cal."Harmon
602, 123 Pac.
797 (1912).
v. Callahan,
214 Ill. App. 104 (1919). Cf. Imperial Water Co.
v. Cameron,
67
Cal.
App. 591, 228 Pac. 678 (1924).
t
Campbell v. McLaurin Invest. Co., 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917) ; Murill

v. Palmer,supra, note 11; semble; Holton v. Andrews, 151 N. C. 340, 66 S. E.

212 (1909) semble. See Roberts v. Watson, 196 Iowa 816, 820, 195 N. W. 211,
212 (1923), approved in 9 Iowa L. B. 140.
'Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant; Williston, Contracts, Vol. III; 23 Mich.
L. Rev.
211.
1
rn a, jurisdiction such as North Carolina where the duty to re-let is
recognized, the practical question arises 4s to whether the burden is on the
landlord to allege and prove reasonable efforts to re-rent or upon the tenant
to plead in mitigation a failure of the landlord to make such efforts. As to
avoidable consequences generally, the accepted rule is that the burden of proof
is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff, by the exercise of proper
industry, could have mitigated his damages, and that in absence of such proof
the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount fixed by the contract. Beissel v.
Vermillion Farmer's Elevator Co., 102 Minn. 229, 113 N. W. 575 (1907);

Milage v. Woodward, 186 N. Y. 252, 78 N. E. 873 (1906); Mindes Millinery
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DISPARAGEMENT

OF GOODS AS TRADE LIBEL

The general American rule is that Equity Courts have no jurisdiction to interfere by injunction to restrain the publication of a
trade libel.' The reason usually given is not constitutional, as a
restraint upon free speech or the press, but because, as the courts
and text writers say, there is an adequate remedy at law.2 This
denial of equitable relief to one libeled will oftentimes work an
irreparable injury and leave him, in effect, remediless. Manifestly
the legal remedy offers no relief against an insolvent; and even
though damages could be collected, more often than not it would be
impossible to know or prove the actual damage which results from a
disparaging statement. The English Courts have led the way from
this position, and they now exercise the same injunctive discretion
over trade libels as over other torts.$ And the modern American
decisions, while not so outspoken as the English authorities, are
Co. v. Wellborn, 201 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 1059 (1918). But a minority
view adopts the contrary result requiring the plaintiff to allege diligence on
his part and the results thereof, in mitigation of damages. Shepard v. Gambill,
29 Ky. L. Rep. 1163, 96 S. W. 1104 (1906) ; Hunt v. Crane, 33 Miss. 669, 69
Am. Dec. 381 (1857); Williston, Contracts, § 1360. And this would seem the
more desirable rule in view ol the difficulty of the tenant in ascertaining the
facts as to the possibility of re-letting.
16 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence,629; 2 High, Injunctions (4th ed.) 968;
Nims, Unfair Competition, 485, 262; 22 Cyc 900; Kidd v'. Horry, 28 Fed. 773
(C. C. Penn., 1886); Citizen's Light, etc. Co. v'. Montgomery, 171 Fed. 553
(C. C. Ala., 1909); American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1913) ; Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (S. D. Ala., 1916) ; Francis v.
Flynn, 118 U. S. 385 (1885) ; Mitchell v. GrandLodge, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 306,

121 S. W. 178 (1909) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 49 Ga.

70, 15 Am. Rep. 674 (1872), the court said: "It is well settled that an injunction
will -not be granted to restrain libel of title or reputation. Not that it is not
wrong, not that thb wrong might not be irreparable, but simply because equity
courts have refused to act in such cases." Illustrates the stubborn attitude the
courts have taken. Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 19
Am. Rep. 310 (1873) ; Marlin Fire Arms Co. v'. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64
N. E. 163 (1902).
Francisv. Flynn, 118 U. S. 385 (1885): "Plaintiff has full remedy at law.
If equity could interfere in such cases, it would draw to itself the
greater part of litigation properly belonging to courts of law"; Citizens Light
etc. Co. v. Montgomery, 171 Fed. 553 (C. C. Ala., 1909); Baltimore Life Ins.
Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. St. 356, 51 AtI. 1024 (1902) ; Chamber of Commerce

v. Fed. Trade Commission, 13 Fed. (2nd.) 673, 686 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926):

"No jurisdiction in equity to enjoin publication of a libel . . . but not
because of constitutional reasons, and such jurisdiction could be conferred by
statute."
'Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339 (1878); Halsey v. Brotherhood, 15
Ch.D. 514 (1879); (required, however, plaintiff to go first to law and have
jury pass upon question whether libelous . . . if so would grant the decree) ; Liverpool Assn. v. Smith, 37 Ch.D. 170 (1887) ; James v. James, 13 Eq.
421 (1872). (No longer require plaintiff to go first to law court-will grant
the injunction if the matter is libelous.)

NOTES
awake to the danger of their position and, whenever some recognized
equitable principle is involved, i.e. where there is some breach of
trust,4 some threat or coercion, 5 some element of furthering a boycott 6 or a conspiracy,7 etc., they are granting the relief necessary.
Probably it is safe to say, from the recent trend of decisions on this
subject in this country, that some court will soon take advantage of
the opportunity here presented to discard this indirect and unsatisfactory approach and blaze a trail direct to the heart of this problem.
Regardless of whether equitable relief is available against trade
libels, the legal remedy of a suit for damages, with whatever of
actual relief it offers, is always open. It is well settled that a
corporation may sue for libel or slander which reflects upon its
business methods" just as an individual can recover for disparaging
language which impeaches his character, his business integrity, or
general fitness for the task with which he is engaged.9 In either
case, however, special damage must be shown whenever the language used is not libelous per se. 10 For language to be libelous
per se against a corporation, the publication must injure the property,
the credit or the business, of the corporation in a pecuniary way.1
Language used involving a mere "puff" of on&s own goods, even
though the practical result is unfair to the rival's product, if in
effect the disparagement is confined to a general comparison of the
two, is not actionable even though malice is shown and special dam"FinnishSociety v. Pub. Co., 219 Mass. 28, 106 N. E. 561 (1914).
'American Plott & Co. v. Na. Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1903).
'Beck v. Teamsters Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. E. 13 (1898) ; Gompers v.

Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
'Farquharv. Nat'l. Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714 (C. C. A 3rd, 1900) ; Iverson
v. Dilno, 44 Mont. 270, 119 Pac. 719 (1911).
'Nat'l. Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 Fed. (2nd.) 763
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927); First Nat'l. Bk. of Waverly v. Winters, 225 N. Y. 47,
121 N. E. 495 (1918); Gross Coal Co. v. Rose, 126 Wisc. 24, 105 N. W. 225
(1905); Hayes v. Press Co., 127 Pa. St. 642, 18 Ad. 331 (1886).
'Spence v. Johnson, 142 Ga. 267, 82 S. E. 646 (1914); Moore v. Francis,
121 N. Y. 199, 23 N. E. 1127 (1890) ; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398, 6
Am. Rep. 105 (1871).
"Nat'l. Refining Co. v. Benso Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 Fed. (2nd.) 763
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. Deright, 147 Fed. 211 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1906); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163
(1902).
'Security Benefit Assn. v. Daily News Pub. Co., 299 Fed. 445 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924) ; Vitagraph Co. v. Ford, 241 Fed. 681 (S. D. N. Y., 1917) ; AxtonFisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169 Ky. 64, 183 S. W. 269 (1916) ;Reporter's Assn. v. Sun Printing & Pub. Co., 186 N. Y. 437, 79 N. E. 710
(1906).

74

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

age proved.' 2 If it were otherwise every manufacturer who publishes that his goods are superior to those of his neighbor, if false,
would subject himself to an action for damages. It is equally true
that where the language used is directed solely to a person's property
or to the quality of the articles which he manufactures or sells, and
contains no imputation upon him as an individual, or in respect to
his trade or profession, it is not libelous per se; but nevertheless,
if untrue, is actionable upon proof of special damage.' 3
=Nonpareil Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasby & Mattison, 108 Fed. 721 (E. D.
C. C. Pa., 1901): "You recommend something which in the experience of all
practical men demonstrates is a fraud . . . short lived and useless for the
purpose intended." Court said: "Such statements are not uncommon among
rivals in trade, and their correctness in each instance is for the determination
of those whose custom is sought, and not the courts." Johnson v. Hitchcock,
15 Johns. (N. Y.) 185 (1818): A statement that X's ferry was better than
Y's was held not actionable, even though the statement was false. Thomas
Hubbuck & Son v. Wilkinson, 68 L. J. N. S. (Q. B.) 34. A statement that
the white zinc of the plaintiff was inferior to that of the defendant, that it
was adulterated and not genuine, was held not actionable. The court said in
effect it was saying that "my goods are better than yours."
"Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salesbery Lab. 17 Fed. (2nd.) 255
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926) : A statement describing plaintiff's goods "this only goes
to prove that Barnum's statement of 50 years ago can be applied even at the
present time," was held not libelous per se. But see Ramharter v. Olson, infra,
note 14, 26 S. D. 499, 128 N. W. 806 (1910); Victor Safe & Lock Co. v.
Deright, 147 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. Neb., 1906): A charge that "X's safes could
be easily burglarized" was held not libelous per se because the language was
directed at the quality or value of the product and not at the personality
behind it; Marlin FirearmsCo. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 304, 64 N. E. 163 (1902) ;
"Marlin rifle has faulty ejector and extractor." Held not libelous per se because it relates entirely to the quality and effectiveness of the goods; Boynton
v. Shaw Stocking Co., 146 Mass. 219, 15 N. E. 507 (1888) : A charge that one
could not get first class goods from the plaintiff's store because he did not
keep such goods was held not libelous per se, the court saying that there was
no imputation of fraud or deceit but rather an attack on the quality of the
goods; Dooling v. Budget Pub. Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N. E. 809 (1887):
Publishing a statement that "X served a wretched dinner . . . the cigars
were stale and the wine not much better . . . never a more unsatisfactory
dinner was served . . ." was held not libelous per se. Court said it was
strong language but nothing more than mere condemnation; Evans v. Harlow,
13 L. J. (N. S.) 120, 5 Q. B. 624 (1844): Lord Denman said in discussing
this general proposition: "A tradesman who offers his goods for sale exposes
himself to observations of this kind, and it is not by averring them to be false
or defamatory that the plaintiff can found a charge of libel. He must show
himself damaged. To hold so would open wide the door to litigation and
might expose every man who said his goods were better than another's to the
risk of an action"; Hehmoyer v. Harper's Weekly, 120 App. Div. 459, a charge
that A's manufactured goods are worthless was held not libelous per se;
Alcott v. Millar's Karri & JarrahForests, 91 L. T. R. (N. S.) 722 (1904):
A charge that American Red Gum blocks in use "only from 6 to 18 months
are now in a rotten condition" was held not libelous per se; Western Counties
Manure Co. v. Laws, L. R. 9 Exch. 218 (1878): A charge that X "manufactured and sold an article of low quality and ought to be the cheapest" of a
class was held not libelous per se.

NOTES
The very difficult situation presents itself whenever the language
in form purports to discuss the quality or value of the rival's product
but in fact impeaches the character of the manufacturer and seller
or reflects unfavorably upon his business ability. The sole question
to be considered in that class of cases is whether the publication has
more than a surface meaning, whether the effect is merely to disparage the goods offered the public or whether it goes behind
the product and attacks the man who makes it or offers it for sale.
One advertising must be careful lest his competitive zeal carry him
beyond the bounds of legitimate "puffing" and disparaging into an
attack upon the character and integrity or business fitness of his
4
competitor. Language having that effect is libelous per se.1
5
that
held
In a recent case the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
1

Penn Iron Wks. Co. v. Henry Voght Co., 29 Ky. 861, 96 S. W. 551 (1906) :
To say of a competitor that he "was a second hand dealer, did inferior work,
was a 'scab establishment,' and did not use a mechanic" is libelous per se.
"Words are actionable per se which tend to prejudice any one in his trade or
profession, and whenever the language has such an effect special damage need
not be shown. Newell, Libel & Slander, 168: 'Defamatory words falsely
spoken of a person, which impute to him unfitness to perform the duties of
office or employment, or the want of integrity are actionable without proof of
special damage'"; Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328, 17 Atl. 266 (1889): A
charge that "it is better to buy Western Beef than to buy from a slaughterhouse where condemned and disease cattle are used" was held libelous per se;
Mowry v. Roobe, 89 Cal. 606, 27 Pac. 157 (1891) : "Don't sow seeds of disease, spread pestilence and death, by buying Chinese pork and lard." Held
libelous Per se against the plaintiff who sold Chinese pork and lard; Holmes v.
Clisby, 118 Ga. 820, 45 S. E. 684 (1903): Publication implying that X sold
low quality goods for "finest quality" was held libelous per se; American Book
Co. v. Gates, 85 Fed. 729 (S. D. C. C., 1898) : It was held libelous per se to
charge that a corporation puts out school books in frontier states "that are
referred to nowadays as laughing stock by intelligent teachers"; Ingram V.
Larsen, 6 Bing. (N. C.) 212 (1840) English: A charge that X was about to
start out on an ocean voyage in an unseaworthy vessel was held libelous per
se as an imputation of unfitness for his task, etc.; Inland Printer Co. v. Economical Half Tone Supply Co., 99 Ill. App. 8 (1901) : A charge that a device
manufactured by A is a "humbug" impeaches the honesty of A and is libelous
per se; Ramharter v. Olson, 26 S. D. 499, 128 N. W. 806 (1910) : A statement
"It may be that, as Barnum says, 'The American people like to be humbugged . . .'" was held libelous per se. But see Erick Bowman Remedy Co.
v. Jensen, etc., supra, note 13, 17 Fed. (2nd) 255; In Linotype Co. v. Typesetting Machine Co., 81 L. T. R. (N. S.) 331 (1899), Lord Chancellor Halsbury said, obiter: "Could it be argued that to say of a fishmonger that he was
in the habit of selling decomposed fish would not be a. libel upon the fishmonger
in the way of his trade"; Larsen v. Brooklyn Eagle, 214 N. Y. 713, 108 N. E.
1098 (1915): A charge that A's goods are unwholesome imputes dishonesty
and fraud to A and is libelous per se; Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. (N. Y.)
537 (1829) : "When words are spoken not of the trader or manufacturer but
of the quality of goods which he deals in or makes, to make them actionable
per se they must impute that he is guilty of fraud, deceit, or malpractice."
5Nat'l. Refining Co. v. Benzo Motor Fuel Co., 20 Fed. (2nd) 763 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927).
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the following language, used in advertising matter by a competitor
of the Benzo Fuel Company, was not libelous per se. "Benzol
causes corrosion and pitting of the cylinders and valves. . . . overheats the engine . . . necessitates frequent grinding of the valves.
.. . starts to congeal at 40 degrees temperature . . . often causes

the carburetor to plug up." It would seem that the position of the
court in this case was the correct one. The language complained of
was directed to the quality or value of the product, without reflecting
upon the honesty, integrity, or business ability of the manufacturer.
Such language is not actionable without proof of actual damage.
Lewis, J., however, in his dissenting opinion, was of the opinion
that the language contained an attack upon the plaintiff in the way
of his business rather than a criticism of Benzo Gas as a thing.
And therein lies the difficulty of such cases. The test is clear;
fitting it to the facts of each case is difficult, and our decided cases
on the point cannot be reconciled. So far as the writer has been
able to find, this question has never been before the North Carolina
Court.
C. R. JONAS.

